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Abstract: What is ambiguity aversion and what is its role as a determinant of technology 
adoption? This study develops and implements a novel ambiguity preference instrument in the 
context of an ongoing RCT pilot program in southwest Uganda promoting adoption of an 
improved variety of sweet potato. No correlation between ambiguity aversion and crop adoption 
is observed, although it is suspected that RCT treatment arms including supply- and demand-
side information reduced the ambiguity of the new variety, probably overcoming any 
ambiguity-preference-related constraints and clouding the picture. Methodological lessons 
learned regarding the development and implementation of an apporopriate ambiguity 
preference measure point to a promising future. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
There exist two distinct fundamental types of uncertainty an individual may face: risk 
and ambiguity. A situation involving risk is one in which the outcome distribution is known, 
subjectively at least, whereas in an ambiguous situation it is not. A relevant example is that 
of the rural farmer deciding how to utilize her land in the upcoming growing season. If 
deciding between planting a familiar crop and renting out her land to another farmer, she 
faces the choice of a known risk versus a certain, albeit lower payoff. That is, she knows how 
her crops will yield in different pest, disease, and weather states of the world and she knows 
the likelihood of each of these states obtaining. If, however, the choice she faces is of  
planting a familiar crop versus an unfamiliar one, her choice is between a risky investment 
and an ambiguous one. 
 While contemporary economic theory has recognized the importance of human risk 
preference and incorporated it through subjective expected utility (SEU) theory (Savage, 
1955), the same cannot be said of ambiguity preference. If one believes the mainstream 
economic consensus that growth and technology adoption are inextricably linked, then the 
omission of ambiguity preference from choice theory must be quite disconcerting. 
 This study introduces and implements a novel instrument to measure the ambiguity 
preference of an individual. It then attempts to estimate the effect of that preference on the 
decision to adopt an improved variety of sweet potato by smallholder farmers in 
southwestern Uganda in the presence of an agricultural outreach program promoting the new 
crop. Due to a lack of funds with which to implement an instrument with a payoff, the 
measure frames its exercise as a 'game,' offering the participant the chance to 'win' a moral 
victory. It follows the form of Binswanger's (1980) now ubiquitous risk measure, asking 
respondents to make a series of eleven binary choices, in this case between a risk with 
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precisely known odds, varying in ten-percentage-point increments from zero to 100, and a 
risk with unknown odds. Adoption of a loan offered by one of the treatment arms of the pilot 
is also analyzed. 
 Unlike Engle Warnick (2007) and Ross (2010) I find no effect of ambiguity 
preference on improved crop adoption. It is possible that existing components of the outreach 
program, specifically the proliferation of supply-side information and the establishment of 
model gardens to demonstrate best practices in most treatment villages, acted to reduce the 
level of ambiguity faced by individual farmers and subsequently relax the constraint imposed 
by any ambiguity preference they may have. It is also possible that ambiguity preference is 
not a significant determinant of crop adoption in the setting and context observed. 
 This study does find strong hints of a positive correlation between loan adoption and 
ambiguity aversion, with an increase of as much as 25 percentage points in the likelihood of 
accepting a loan when offered for ambiguity averse (AA) individuals versus non-AA 
individuals. This is a curious result, similar to findings by Bryan (2010) where adoption of a 
financial services product correlates positively with ambiguity aversion. Possible 
explanations for this abound but financial technologies are inherently unique and require 
special attention that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Ambiguity and Risk 
 
The study of decision under uncertainty dates at least as far back as Daniel Bernoulli's (1738) 
original statement of the expected utility hypothesis. Two centuries passed before von 
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Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) investigation into the axioms under which the 
proposition holds and the study of this key component of decision-making behavior finally 
began to advance on firmer empirical and mathematical ground. Savage (1955) extended 
expected utility theory to include subjective beliefs (SEU), cementing what has become a 
central pillar  of the paradigm of contemporary economic theory. 
 Ellsberg's (1961) two-urn experiment, however, demonstrated a broadly applicable 
instance in which individuals consistently exhibit a preference for risks with precisely known 
oods versus risks with imprecisely known odds, what is now commonly known as ambiguity 
aversion. This is a violation of SEU theory which, as it stands, fails to distinguish between 
the two types of uncertainty and subsequently implies indifference between them. Ellsberg's 
experiment illuminates the importance of this 'Knightian', or unknowable, uncertainty 
(Knight, 1921); distinguishing ambiguity from risk and suggesting the need for a remedy to 
SEU theory. 
 Subsequent empirical studies have built on Ellsberg's work, finding that individuals 
are willing to pay to avoid imprecisely known risks in favor of precisely known (but 
knowably equivalent) ones (Becker and Brownson, 1964; Chow and Sarin, 2001), that this 
preference persists in experimental market settings (Sarin and Weber, 1993), and that even 
experienced business owners and managers, who may reasonably be assumed to behave as 
experienced and well-conditioned expectation-value-maximizers, exhibit such a preference 
(Chesson & Viscusi, 2003). 
 While the distinction between risk and Knightian uncertainty is now well-established, 
the path toward incorporating the latter into SEU theory remains unclear. Economists, to be 
fair, will be hard-pressed to measure the effect of an individual's ambiguity preference on her 
decision making without first measuring that preference! And so we come to the first hurdle. 
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 There remains, as of yet, no consensus on a proper instrument with which to measure 
AA. Recent studies measuring the effect of AA on agricultural technology adoption (Engle-
Warnick, 2007), (Bryan, 2010),  (Ross, 2010) employ decision sheets with five binary 
choices to be made between known and unknown risks and a penalty to be paid from the 
potential reward for avoiding ambiguous risks in favor of precisely known ones. They 
therefore measure the willingness to pay to avoid ambiguity when real money is at stake, a 
proxy for AA, and not a particularly good one. Ambiguity takes many forms in the real world 
and any relevant measure must take account of these. 
 A risk may have known outcomes and known payoffs for each but the frequencies of 
each outcome obtaining may be completely unknown. Or, conversely, the distribution of 
potential outcomes may be well-known but with the potential payoffs for each outcome 
remaining unknown at decision time. More challenging yet, and nowhere to be found in any 
of the discussion in the literature, is the realistic possibility of partial ambiguity, where the 
odds of potential outcomes or the values of potential payoffs are imprecisely known but at 
least bounded. 
 
2.2 Agricultural Technology Adoption 
 
The empirical study of determinants of agricultural technology adoption (ATO) has a 
decades-long history dating back at least to the 1960s and studies coinciding with the arrival 
of the Green Revolution in the developing world. Feder and Zilberman authored the most 
widely-cited meta-analysis of empirical research in the field to date (1985) reviewing 
findings regarding the effects of farm size, risk and uncertainty, human capital, labor 
availability, tenure, and constraints to credit and inputs. A key recommendation is the study 
of ATO as a continuous as opposed to a binary variable, one this study attempts but fails to 
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follow for lack of the requisite data. Sunding and Zilberman (2001) update the following 
years of work. 
 Engle-Warnick (2007), Bryan (2010), and Ross (2010) are the only three studies done 
to date which specifically investigate the role of AA on ATO and only Engle-Warnick (2007) 
has been published. All find that ambiguity aversion itself is an important determinant of 
technology adoption, although all have small sample sizes. 
 Missing from the literature is empirical evidence regarding the roles of age, 
education, and other demographic observables in driving an individual's ambiguity 
preference. The closest thing to such an analysis is Borghans, et al. (2009) paper comparing 
ambiguity preferences between male and female subjects. This study aims to be the first to 
address these questions. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Randomized Control Trial 
 
This study piggybacks on an ongoing agricultural outreach pilot program, designed 
as a randomized control trial (RCT), in southwest Uganda. The Government of Uganda, 
Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) of the World Bank, and the NGO BRAC 
collaborated to fund and implement the RCT. It was designed to test the effect on improved 
crop adoption by smallholder farmers (<5 acres cultivated by household) of relaxing 
constraints on supply- and demand-side information, credit, savings, and risk. The new crop 
is a vitamin-A biofortified orange-fleshed sweet potato (OFSP), selectively bred (non-
genetically modified) over several generations to increase vitamin-A concentration. The goal 
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is to address vitamin-A deficiency (VAD), part of the broader trend of targeting 
micronutrient malnutrition in the developing world with biofortified staple crops. 
 The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that over half of the world's 
population does not consume enough of each micronutrient to support good health. This 
'hidden hunger' can have severe short- and long-term impacts ranging from lethargy and 
reduced ability to fight infection, to blindness, impaired physical and cognitive development, 
and death. The WHO estimates that VAD affects 250 million preschool-age children around 
the world. Between 250 and 500 thousand go blind annually and half of these die within the 
following year (WHO). 
 Previous interventions have typically used oral supplements in the form of tablets or 
liquid drops to treat deficiencies of vitamin A, iron, and zinc. While effective for those who 
receive treatment, supplement-based interventions frequently fail to reach those most in need 
and, in any case, require indefinite funding and attention. Recently the alternative method of 
staple crop biofortification has gained traction. Improved staple crops implicitly target those 
most in need as the individuals who rely most heavily on staples, the poorest, are the ones 
most susceptible to hidden hunger. The method has the added benefit that once the improved 
variety is adopted, it remains in an area indefinitely and at zero cost (Graham, 2001). The 
efficacy of OFSP in reducing VAD was demonstrated by Low’s (2007) study in rural 
Mozambique. 
 The most significant open question that remains regarding such interventions is an 
economic one: How to get people to adopt the improved crop variety? What are the 
determinants of agricultural technology adoption in less developed countries? 
 BRAC and the Government of Uganda target southwestern Uganda as the site of the 
JSDF OFSP pilot study due to the region’s significant discrepancy between income and 
nutrition outcomes which fall significantly above and below national averages, respectively. 
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The RCT covers 210 villages, including 30 control villages, delivering layered treatments 
over two years (four growing seasons) including relaxing constraints on supply- and demand-
side information, agricultural inputs, credit, savings, and risk. There are seven treatment arms  
of 30 villages each, including control, and the treatment schedule is as follows. 
 
 
 
  
Agricultural interventions include a workshop at the beginning of each growing 
season for new OFSP farmers and an allotment of enough OFSP vines to plant 1/4 acre. 
Support is provided by agriculture project assistants (PAs) who visit each village on a 
quarterly basis. One resident is designated a Community Agriculture Promoter (CAP) in 
most villages to provide regular support for her neighbors and to maintain a model garden in 
which she showcases best agricultural practices. 
 Health interventions include monthly informational sessions conducted in each 
village by health PAs covering infant, child, and maternal health and nutrition issues. These 
highlight, among other concepts, the importance of micronutrient nutrition, a balanced diet, 
and the role that OFSP consumption can play in this bigger picture. Growth Monitoring and 
Treatment Arm  Clusters  Observations per 
cluster  
Sample  
T1: Agricultural 
Interventions Only  
30  40  1200  
T2: Agriculture + 
Health  
120  40  4800  
 
Sub-treatments of T2  
T2a: T2+Credit  30  40  1200  
T2b: T2+Voucher  30  40  1200  
T2c: T2+Insurance  30  40  1200  
T2d: T2 Only  30  40  1200  
Total  120  4800  
T3: Health Only  30  40  1200  
Control  30  40  1200  
Total Sample  210  8400  
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Promotion (GMP) is also conducted for children under two at these monthly sessions. This 
involves measuring and recording the weight of each child in order to observe individual 
growth trends and to enable intervention if necessary. Additionally, one resident is 
designated a Community Health Promoter (CHP) in most villages to provide regular 
informational support for her neighbors. 
 All four Tier 2 treatments include both agricultural and health interventions. 
Residents of T2a villages are offered the option to take out a loan in order to grow more 
OFSP (whether it be used to acquire land, labor, or other inputs). Residents of T2b villages 
are offered the option to purchase a voucher for OFSP vines and fertilizer at harvest to be 
redeemed at the next planting season, a savings mechanism. Residents of T2c villages are 
offered a guaranteed buyback of a fixed quantity of OFSP at a fixed price prior to planting 
the crop, a sort of market insurance. 
 Sampling was done in two phases: at the household and village level. A census was 
conducted in 2013 of all households in the four districts where the study takes place. 
Households were selected for participation based on the following criteria: 
  -Agricultural households cultivating five or fewer acres of land 
  -Households containing a woman of reproductive age (15-49 years) 
  -Households containing a pregnant woman or child less than two years of  
  age 
  -Female-headed households of a woman of reproductive age 
 Six treatment arms and one control group were randomly assigned at village level. 
These treatments were evenly distributed across four BRAC branch offices. The 
randomization was balanced on village-level variables BRAC branch, village size, market 
access, and access to health clinics. 
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 The random household sampling and random assignment of villages to treatments 
was done in conjunction such that a highly targeted sample and a perfectly balanced 
randomization was generated. To ensure this, the process of household sampling, village 
assignment, and balance testing for 1000 random draws was repeated, thus selecting the draw 
that both minimized the maximum t-statistic and contained the least number of significant 
differences (p-value<0.1) between treatment and control groups across the balance variables 
of interest (Bbosa, 2015). 
 
treatmentTI |       Age  Education        AA 
Control: No Inte |  38.06722   6.46492  5.604816 
T1: Agriculture  |  37.48778   6.27814  5.601173 
T2a: Agriculture |  39.76208  6.364047   6.07764 
T2b: Agriculture |  38.26126  5.986251  5.603531 
T2c: Agriculture |  38.49009  6.231897  5.810606 
T2d: Agriculture |  38.54041  5.936842  5.682021 
 T3: Health Only |  38.05009  6.138418  5.718935 
 
The table above displays respondents' age, education, and ambiguity aversion by treatment 
group, showing no significant heterogeneity. 
 The baseline survey was conducted from April to June 2014 by a hired firm. 7,694 
surveys were completed from a targeted sample of 8,400. Enumerators collected data using 
paper surveys which were then digitally encoded by BRAC employees. Intervention began 
before the first growing season of 2015 in January and continued through the end of 2016 
over four growing seasons. The midline survey was completed from August to September 
2016, after three growing seasons, with the endline survey to come in 2017-2018. 7,334 
surveys were completed from the group of 7,694 households which completed the baseline 
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survey. Enumerators were hired and trained by BRAC directly and the survey was completed 
using the mobile platform SurveyCTO. 
 
3.2 Risk Preference Instrument 
 
 The baseline survey risk preference instrument utilized a series of five binary choices 
between a potential coin toss for 200 thousand Uganda shillings (approximately 70 U$D at 
the time) and a fixed payoff of 40, 60, 80, 100, and 140 thousand Uganda shillings, in 
increasing order. For this analysis, risk averseness was defined as a binary variable, with 
respondents labelled as risk-averse if they switch to the guaranteed payoff at 40, 60, 80, or 
100 thousand (equivalent expectation value as coin toss) Ugandan shillings. 
 
3.3 Ambiguity Preference Instrument 
 
To measure ambiguity aversion, I designed a novel instrument based on Binswanger's 
(1980) risk aversion instrument and included it on the midline survey, which attempted to 
follow up with original respondents from baseline. Like Binswanger's, the instrument is a 
schedule of binary choices to be completed in order by each individual. But whereas his 
asked the respondent to choose between a guaranteed payoff and taking a known risk for a 
greater possible known payoff, this measure asks respondents to choose between a known 
risk for a known payoff and an unknown risk for the same known payoff.  
The exercise was framed as a ‘game’ as games are culturally acceptable and familiar 
to Ugandans, although they are much more commonly enjoyed by men than women (who 
constitute over 90% of respondents). Enumerators were given blue and green hair curlers to 
act as the ‘balls’ and to use a simple plastic bag as the ‘urn’ as props to physically 
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demonstrate the game to respondents. They were instructed to read verbatim from the 
instrument (see Appendix) while explaining and playing the game for the sake of uniformity. 
Respondents were first asked to choose between a risk with a zero percent chance of a 
win and an unknown risk. This was demonstrated as a bag of ten hair curlers, all blue, with a 
green needing to be drawn for the win. The total number of curlers was held constant at ten, 
with the proportion varying from zero green to ten green, one at a time. Multiple ambiguity 
aversion indices combining the experimental data were constructed and explored. These are 
covered in the analysis section. 
 
4. Model and Hypothesis 
 
Logit and probit analyses are utilized to analyze the adoption decision of OFSP 
against risk aversion as measured at baseline and ambiguity aversion as measured at midline. 
Tribe dummies are included in the second round of regressions, an important determinant of 
OFSP adoption as for some tribes, sweet potato is a common staple, whereas for others it is 
regarded as pig food. Controls are added in the third round. They include age, age squared, 
education, household size, farm size, and tribe. 
 
Model:  (OFSP Adoption)i = 0 + 1RA_bi + 2AAi + 3Treatment Groupi +  
nControlsi i 
Null Hypothesis: H0: 2 = 0 
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5. Analysis 
 
5.1 Preliminary Ambiguity Preference Indices 
 
The original idea for an amiguity preference index, AA1, was to generate a discrete 
index, ranging from 0 to 11 taking whole number values. The ambiguity preference 
instrument only has 12 possible rationally consistent responses (actually 10 if one argues that 
it is irrational to take a risk with guaranteed zero odds versus one with an unknown chance of 
success, and alternately irrational to take a risk with unknown odds versus one with 
guaranteed success). An individual who always prefers the known odds, regardless of their 
level, is extremely ambiguity averse and the index assigns a value of 11. On the other hand, 
one who always takes the unknown odds relative to known is ambiguity-loving, and is 
assigned a value of 0. The AA1 index varies linearly between these two extremes. This 
would have made a decent measure had more than 25% of responses been rationally 
consistent, but as it omits all others, it proved far from ideal. 
The next step, AA2, was to utilize a first-switch definition of ambiguity preference, 
assigning an index value for each individual based on her first switch from the unknown to 
known odds, as the known odds increase. The benefit of this method is that it avoids 
discarding the responses of 75% of individuals, the drawback being that it omits a high 
percentage of the information contained within each individual response. This is a balancing 
act that remains unavoidable unless other concessions are made. It led directly to the creation 
of the AA6 and AA7 indices which succeed in not omitting large numbers of 
respondents/responses, but do so at the cost of introducing the arbitrary assignment of index 
values. 
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Both AA1 and AA2 also have the added drawback of assuming linearity in the nature 
of ambiguity preference and its effects on decision making; that is to say that they impose the 
idea that going from 3 to 6 (ambiguity loving to mildly ambiguity averse) should have the 
same effect as going from 8 to 11 (moderately ambiguity averse to maximally ambiguity 
averse). They additionally assume that the effect of an individual being ambuiguity loving on 
her choices will be opposite of the effect of her being ambiguity averse. In this spirit, AA3 
and AA4 were built on AA1 and AA2, respectively, but assigned values from 0 to 5. 
Ambiguity loving and neutral individuals were assigned the value 0, while ambiguity averse 
individuals were assigned a value from 1 to 5, whether by the rationally-consistent-
observation method of AA1 or the first switch method of AA2. 
 
5.2 AA8 
 
 AA8 is constructed on the first switch method of AA2 but is binary. Ambiguity 
averse individuals are assigned a value of 1, others 0. This is an additional step to try to limit 
the introduction of arbitrary levels to the ambiguity indices as well as to avoid any 
assumption of linearity. The coarseness of the binary measure, it was hoped, would also help 
to better resolve any effect of ambiguity preference on decision making. 
 
5.3 AA5 
 
AA5 is constructed similarly to AA8, except that respondents are only defined as 
ambiguity averse if they switch to the known risk at or before 30%. This is a binary index 
indicating those who are, therefore, highly ambiguity averse or not. 
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5.4 AA6 
 
 AA6 is an incremental disrete index varying from -16 to 16, constructed by utilizing 
all responses. A series of intermediate variables was defined with value 5 (for the first 
variable) if the respondent selects the known zero percent risk as opposed to the one with the 
unknown odds (maximally and irrationally ambiguity averse) and zero otherwise. The second 
intermediate variable takes the value 4 if the respondent selects the known 10 percent risk as 
opposed to the unknown one, and zero otherwise, and so on. The values that the intermediate 
variables take then change to zero or negative one, zero or negative 2, and so on for 
respondents who take the ambiguous risk when the known risk is 60%, 70%, etc. Responses 
when the known risk is 50% are omitted. 
 AA6 for each individual is defined as the sum of these intermediate variable values, 
so individuals with a positive AA6 can be said to be ambiguity averse, zero AA6 ambiguity 
neutral, and negative AA6 ambiguity loving, with a greater absolute value indicating a 
stronger preference. 
 This weighted sum method is an alternate way of dealing with rationally inconsistent 
responses that has the benefit of not ignoring the large number of responses that the first-
switch indices necessarily omit. The drawback is that the assignment of values for given 
responses, and therefore the value that the index itself takes for each individual is, again, 
arbitrary. 
 
5.5 AA7 
 
 AA7 is a binary index constructed from AA6, with respondents defined as ambiguity 
averse and taking value 1 if AA6 is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. 
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5.6 OFSP Adoption Findings 
 
 Please refer to Section 8.3 to review regression outputs for the effects of AA5-AA8 
on OFSP adoption probability. Outputs listed are marginal effects at mean. Regardless of the 
constructed index, findings are consistent across the board. No effect is seen on OFSP 
adoption by either risk (RA_b, risk aversion at baseline) or ambiguity preference. Inclusion 
of treatment group and controls does not change this and results are consistent between logit 
and probit analyses. Between approximately 5,100 and 5,900 observations are included in 
each regression from a total sample of 8,400 with 7,693 surveys completed at baseline and 
7,033 surveys completed at midline. Attrition and data quality are obvious concerns to be 
elaborated in Section 6. 
 We do observe strong effects of treatment group, in line with expectations. All 
observations are relative to control group, and we observe that almost all treatment groups 
have an OFSP adoption rate around 50-55% higher than that of control. The exception is 
group T3 which only received the demand-side informational treatment and adopted OFSP at 
the same rate as the control group on average. This was the one treatment group, other than 
control, that did not receive the supply-side informational treatment which, importantly, also 
came with OFSP starting inputs including ¼ acre worth of OFSP vines. These findings are 
robust to the inclusion of controls. 
 Also note that for most tribes we observe a strongly negative effect on OFSP 
adoption. For context, the Baganda and Banyankole tribes each constitute roughly 49% of the 
sample, and Baganda is the omitted category for the tribe variable so all observations are 
relative to that group. This finding again makes a lot of sense; the Bagandas consume several 
local varieties of sweet potato as a staple food, whereas other tribes in the sample regard 
sweet potato as pig food. The Bagandas should be expected, therefore, to much more readily 
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adopt a new variety of sweet potato than their neighbors. Findings, again, are robust to the 
inclusion of controls. 
 With respect to controls, only household size consistently produces a statistically 
(although not economically) significant effect of about +1.25% on the probability of OFSP 
adoption at 99% confidence. 
 
5.7 Loan Adoption Findings 
  
 The findings with respect to the effects of ambiguity preference on loan adoption for 
members of treatment group T2a, the only group offered loans or ‘agricultural credit,’ are 
more interesting. Ambiguity preference binary indices AA5 and AA7 (using first switch 
method and weighted sum method) both indicate that the ambiguity averse are about 21.5% 
more likely to accept a loan when offered than their non AA neighbors. The AA6 continuous 
weighted sum index is in rough agreement as well. The output is 10 times lower, but one 
must remember that AA5 and AA7 are binary and their values may be interpreted as the 
effect of being ambiguity averse vs. not. AA6 varies discretely from -16 to 16 and the 
resulting coefficient must be interpreted as the effect on loan adoption probability of 
changing AA6 by a single unit. 
All are consistent across logit and probit analyses and are robust to the inclusion of 
controls. Confidence level ranges from 90% for the AA5 index to 99% for the AA6 index. 
AA8, however, is not statistically different from zero, although it does have a positive point 
estimate comparable and well within a standard error of the coefficients on the other indices. 
Moreso than for OFSP adoption, unfortunately, sample size in the loan adoption analysis is a 
concern. Only about 170-200 observations are included in this portion of the analysis from 
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1,200 households in treatment group T2a in the original sample. Results may be regarded as 
intriguing but should not be thought of as definitve. 
Point estimates of the effects of the binary risk aversion measure RA_b on loan 
adoption fall between -10% and -18%, in line with the literature and common sense. In the 
AA6 and AA7 analyses, these estimates are statistically significant to 95% confidence, 
whereas in the AA5 and AA8 regressions, they are not significantly different from zero. 
These results are consistent across logit and probit analyses and are robust to the inclusion of 
controls. No controls were found to be significantly correlated with loan adoption. 
  
6. Discussion 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
 
 The primary question of this study is the effect of AA on OFSP adoption. It is the 
opinion of the author that the question remains to be answered. Analysis outputs on this topic 
are consistent and not statistically different from zero, although there may be a number of 
reasons for this. 
 First and foremost, the supply- and demand-side informational treatments of the 
OFSP agricultural outreach pilot program may well have acted to reduce the level of 
ambiguity that the improved sweet potato variety presented to farmers. It is unfortunately 
impossible to disentangle proof of this since all groups that received supply-side information 
also received starting inputs including ¼ acre of OFSP vines. Future studies must reexamine 
this question in the absence of such a universal informational treatment and outside of a 
context in which starting inputs are provided. It is also entirely possible that ambiguity 
preference does not play a role in technology adoption. Results regarding a positive 
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correltation between AA and loan adoption are suggestive and in line with findings by Bryan 
(2010) but should not be considered robust. 
  
6.2 Issues, Lessons Learned, and Looking Forward 
 
This study was hampered by design and implementation issues. Most villages, 
although receiving distinct informational treatments, are within shouting distance of one 
another. In some cases, a single village was split into two, three, and in one case, as many as 
four ‘different’ villages for the purpose of this study, each in a different treatment group. 
Combine this proximity with the local custom of providing free vines to one’s neighbors and 
it quickly becomes clear that this RCT was, by design, unable to provide distinct and separate 
treatments to different villages. 
Implementation issues arising from underfunding and poor incentive structures must 
also be mentioned in order to inform proper interpretation of results. Project assistants, the 
agriculutural and health outreach agents responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the 
intervention were not paid for transport costs. Given the typical distances between BRAC 
regional offices, where each began her day, and the villages to be served, it was necessary to 
hire a motorcycle taxi for transport. The cost of doing this 21 or 22 days per month was 
greater than the salary paid to the project assistants by about 10-30%. An improved analysis 
would therefore utilize distance from village to BRAC regional office as a key control to act 
as a proxy for intervention delivery intensity. It is my impression that they mostly stayed 
close. 
The author also remains displeased with the ambiguity preference instrument itself. 
The ‘unknown’ option with which respondents are presented is constructed as such: the urn 
contains 10 balls, green and blue only, with an unknown combination somewhere between 10 
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green and zero blue, and zero green and ten blue, inclusive. The respondent is allowed to 
decide which color wins before drawing from the urn in order to exclude the possibility of 
being tricked. This amounts to a compound lottery whose probability of success is a perfectly 
knowable 50%, given the information provided and given that the respondent can do the 
analysis, which leads to the next point. 
The limited numeracy of most respondents was a key challenge in playing this 
unavoidably mathematical game. It was often slow and difficult to explain the game, even 
with physical props, and it was often unclear how well respondents ultimately understood it. 
This must be carefully taken into account as ambiguity preference measures and, even 
already much more mature, risk measures are developed in the future. In the context of this 
study and given the compound lottery that is the risk with an ‘unknown’ chance of success, 
this was surely a boon. In testing, however, even graduate students and Ph.D.s of economics 
seemed not to notice and still typically selected known odds of 40% over the ‘unknown’ yet 
knowable 50% lottery. The internal validity of the instrument itself, to this author, remains an 
open question and one that requires more attention and debate.  
Another concern is uniformity of implementation. Appendix 8.5 shows a histogram of 
respondents’ AA2 first-switch index, grouped by enumerator. There is severe heterogeneity 
in distribution width, center, and general form. Given this evidence and the nuanced and 
subtle nature of the measure it must be argued that, going forward, much attention must be 
paid to the strict uniformity of how the ‘game’ is played if results between and even within 
studies are to be compared. 
The challenges then are many and subtle and difficult, but if one believes that growth 
and technology adoption are inherently intertwined, economics as a field must learn to 
properly define, measure, and research the effects of this key human preference regarding 
ambiguity. This is a relatively low-hanging fruit, and potentially a big one. 
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8. Appendix 
 
8.1  Treatment Village Map 
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8.2  Ambiguity Preference Instrument 
 
GAME 
 
Now I will ask you to play a game. I will give you a choice between two risks, Risk 1 and 
Risk 2. 
 
Risk 1 is a bag containing 10 balls that are either green or blue and if you pick a green ball 
you win! You can see how many of the 10 balls are green and how many are blue before you 
pick. 
 
Risk 2 is a bag which also contains 10 balls that are either green or blue, but you cannot see 
how many of the balls are green or blue before you pick. They may all be green, all blue, or 
some mix of both. For Risk 2, you get to pick which color is the winner before you pick a 
ball, so that you cannot be cheated. If you draw a ball of your chosen winning color, you 
win! 
 
In both cases, you may examine the bags after you pick, so that you can confirm that this 
information is true and so you cannot be cheated. 
 
REMEMBER:   
 
IN BAG 1, WE KNOW HOW MANY BALLS OF EACH COLOR THERE ARE 
IN BAG 2, WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY BALLS OF EACH COLOR 
THERE ARE 
 
If Bag 1 has 0 green balls and 10 blue balls, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
 
If Bag 1 has 1 green ball and 9 blue balls, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
 
If Bag 1 has 2 green balls and 8 blue balls, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
 
If Bag 1 has 3 green balls and 7 blue balls, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
 
If Bag 1 has 4 green balls and 6 blue balls, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
 
If Bag 1 has 5 green balls and 5 blue balls, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
 
If Bag 1 has 6 green balls and 4 blue balls, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
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If Bag 1 has 7 green balls and 3 blue balls, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
 
If Bag 1 has 8 green balls and 2 blue balls, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
 
If Bag 1 has 9 green balls and 1 blue ball, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
 
If Bag 1 has 10 green balls and 0 blue balls, and green wins in Bag 1, do you prefer Risk 1 or 
Risk 2? 
 
REMIND THE RESPONDENT THAT FOR RISK 2, SHE ALWAYS GETS TO 
CHOOSE WHICH COLOR WINS BEFORE DRAWING A BALL FROM THE 
BAG, SO THAT SHE KNOWS SHE CANNOT BE CHEATED. 
 
 
 
8.3  OFSP Adoption Regression Tables 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES logit probit logit with treatment 
group 
probit with 
treatment group 
logit with treatment 
group and controls 
probit with 
treatment group 
and controls 
       
RA_b -0.00624 -0.00615 -0.00290 -0.000576 -0.00200 -0.000408 
 (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0336) (0.0309) (0.0348) (0.0320) 
AA5 0.0513 0.0513 0.0230 0.0246 0.0403 0.0394* 
 (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0254) (0.0229) (0.0255) (0.0228) 
T1   0.554*** 0.551*** 0.552*** 0.548*** 
   (0.0591) (0.0509) (0.0606) (0.0523) 
T2a   0.532*** 0.530*** 0.534*** 0.530*** 
   (0.0631) (0.0549) (0.0646) (0.0563) 
T2b   0.513*** 0.510*** 0.514*** 0.509*** 
   (0.0665) (0.0586) (0.0683) (0.0604) 
T2c   0.537*** 0.535*** 0.539*** 0.535*** 
   (0.0636) (0.0556) (0.0656) (0.0574) 
T2d   0.526*** 0.525*** 0.526*** 0.523*** 
   (0.0621) (0.0540) (0.0638) (0.0556) 
T3   -0.0616 -0.0501 -0.0646 -0.0557 
   (0.156) (0.128) (0.159) (0.131) 
Age     0.00272 0.00205 
     (0.00337) (0.00310) 
Age2     -2.44e-05 -1.75e-05 
     (3.51e-05) (3.22e-05) 
Education     0.00125 0.00132 
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     (0.00274) (0.00249) 
hhsize     0.0115** 0.0106*** 
     (0.00447) (0.00401) 
farmsize     0.000844 0.000774 
     (0.00290) (0.00209) 
banyankole     -0.0664 -0.0570 
     (0.0442) (0.0403) 
bakiga     -0.216*** -0.213*** 
     (0.0648) (0.0658) 
banyarwanda     0.0400 0.0373 
     (0.0498) (0.0458) 
banyoro     0.0744 0.0625 
     (0.107) (0.103) 
batooro     0.398*** 0.398*** 
     (0.0845) (0.0908) 
bakonjo     -0.178 -0.171 
     (0.238) (0.239) 
amba     -0.261*** -0.260*** 
     (0.0406) (0.0409) 
other     -0.178*** -0.160** 
     (0.0641) (0.0668) 
       
Observations 5,288 5,288 5,288 5,288 5,098 5,098 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES logit probit logit with 
treatment group 
probit with 
treatment group 
logit with 
treatment group 
and controls 
probit with 
treatment group 
and controls 
       
RA_b -0.0166 -0.0166 -0.0138 -0.0104 -0.0119 -0.00911 
 (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0318) (0.0294) (0.0324) (0.0299) 
AA6 0.000815 0.000819 0.00106 0.000876 0.00146 0.00123 
 (0.00227) (0.00229) (0.00185) (0.00169) (0.00190) (0.00174) 
T1   0.565*** 0.562*** 0.563*** 0.558*** 
   (0.0562) (0.0477) (0.0576) (0.0489) 
T2a   0.546*** 0.542*** 0.548*** 0.542*** 
   (0.0613) (0.0527) (0.0628) (0.0540) 
T2b   0.522*** 0.517*** 0.524*** 0.517*** 
   (0.0669) (0.0587) (0.0686) (0.0603) 
T2c   0.544*** 0.540*** 0.546*** 0.540*** 
   (0.0629) (0.0545) (0.0648) (0.0562) 
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T2d   0.532*** 0.528*** 0.533*** 0.527*** 
   (0.0624) (0.0539) (0.0641) (0.0555) 
T3   -0.0276 -0.0220 -0.0317 -0.0286 
   (0.155) (0.125) (0.159) (0.129) 
Age     0.00291 0.00223 
     (0.00320) (0.00295) 
Age2     -2.72e-05 -2.05e-05 
     (3.29e-05) (3.04e-05) 
Education     0.00125 0.00130 
     (0.00251) (0.00229) 
hhsize     0.0124*** 0.0114*** 
     (0.00412) (0.00373) 
farmsize     7.51e-05 0.000184 
     (0.00217) (0.00178) 
banyankole     -0.0732* -0.0626* 
     (0.0405) (0.0372) 
bakiga     -0.208*** -0.204*** 
     (0.0686) (0.0695) 
banyarwanda     0.0207 0.0199 
     (0.0463) (0.0427) 
banyoro     0.0743 0.0630 
     (0.106) (0.102) 
batooro     0.339*** 0.331*** 
     (0.113) (0.119) 
bakonjo     -0.162 -0.156 
     (0.244) (0.243) 
amba     -0.260*** -0.259*** 
     (0.0379) (0.0386) 
other     -0.169*** -0.152** 
     (0.0588) (0.0612) 
       
Observations 5,880 5,880 5,880 5,880 5,669 5,669 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES logit probit logit with treatment 
group 
probit with 
treatment group 
logit with treatment 
group and controls 
probit with 
treatment group and 
controls 
       
RA_b -0.0160 -0.0160 -0.0131 -0.00992 -0.0109 -0.00831 
 (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0317) (0.0293) (0.0323) (0.0297) 
AA7 0.0177 0.0177 0.00695 0.00652 0.0182 0.0159 
 (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0255) (0.0232) (0.0259) (0.0234) 
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T1   0.565*** 0.562*** 0.563*** 0.557*** 
   (0.0562) (0.0477) (0.0576) (0.0489) 
T2a   0.546*** 0.542*** 0.548*** 0.542*** 
   (0.0612) (0.0526) (0.0628) (0.0540) 
T2b   0.522*** 0.517*** 0.524*** 0.517*** 
   (0.0669) (0.0586) (0.0685) (0.0603) 
T2c   0.544*** 0.540*** 0.545*** 0.540*** 
   (0.0629) (0.0545) (0.0648) (0.0563) 
T2d   0.532*** 0.528*** 0.533*** 0.527*** 
   (0.0623) (0.0539) (0.0640) (0.0555) 
T3   -0.0275 -0.0220 -0.0318 -0.0284 
   (0.155) (0.125) (0.159) (0.129) 
Age     0.00294 0.00225 
     (0.00321) (0.00296) 
Age2     -2.75e-05 -2.07e-05 
     (3.30e-05) (3.04e-05) 
Education     0.00127 0.00131 
     (0.00250) (0.00228) 
hhsize     0.0125*** 0.0115*** 
     (0.00412) (0.00373) 
farmsize     9.28e-05 0.000195 
     (0.00217) (0.00178) 
banyankole     -0.0730* -0.0624* 
     (0.0407) (0.0373) 
bakiga     -0.209*** -0.205*** 
     (0.0687) (0.0696) 
banyarwanda     0.0205 0.0198 
     (0.0464) (0.0428) 
banyoro     0.0761 0.0647 
     (0.106) (0.102) 
batooro     0.339*** 0.331*** 
     (0.111) (0.118) 
bakonjo     -0.168 -0.161 
     (0.241) (0.242) 
amba     -0.261*** -0.260*** 
     (0.0377) (0.0384) 
other     -0.170*** -0.153** 
     (0.0589) (0.0613) 
       
Observations 5,880 5,880 5,880 5,880 5,669 5,669 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES logit probit logit with treatment 
group 
probit with 
treatment group 
logit with treatment 
group and controls 
probit with 
treatment group and 
controls 
       
RA_b -0.00744 -0.00744 -0.00336 -0.00121 -0.00315 -0.00173 
 (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0336) (0.0309) (0.0347) (0.0319) 
AA8 -0.00105 -0.00106 0.00819 0.00733 0.00895 0.00791 
 (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0266) (0.0245) (0.0264) (0.0243) 
T1   0.554*** 0.551*** 0.553*** 0.548*** 
   (0.0591) (0.0509) (0.0606) (0.0521) 
T2a   0.533*** 0.531*** 0.536*** 0.532*** 
   (0.0627) (0.0545) (0.0641) (0.0555) 
T2b   0.513*** 0.510*** 0.514*** 0.509*** 
   (0.0665) (0.0587) (0.0683) (0.0603) 
T2c   0.538*** 0.535*** 0.540*** 0.536*** 
   (0.0634) (0.0552) (0.0653) (0.0569) 
T2d   0.526*** 0.524*** 0.527*** 0.523*** 
   (0.0623) (0.0541) (0.0638) (0.0555) 
T3   -0.0620 -0.0503 -0.0639 -0.0543 
   (0.155) (0.127) (0.159) (0.130) 
Age     0.00272 0.00209 
     (0.00335) (0.00309) 
Age2     -2.43e-05 -1.78e-05 
     (3.48e-05) (3.20e-05) 
Education     0.00126 0.00136 
     (0.00275) (0.00250) 
hhsize     0.0115** 0.0106*** 
     (0.00449) (0.00403) 
farmsize     0.000784 0.000702 
     (0.00292) (0.00209) 
banyankole     -0.0573 -0.0483 
     (0.0431) (0.0394) 
bakiga     -0.216*** -0.213*** 
     (0.0635) (0.0648) 
banyarwanda     0.0394 0.0370 
     (0.0496) (0.0457) 
banyoro     0.0741 0.0630 
     (0.106) (0.102) 
batooro     0.397*** 0.396*** 
     (0.0863) (0.0930) 
bakonjo     -0.163 -0.156 
     (0.240) (0.241) 
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amba     -0.267*** -0.266*** 
     (0.0397) (0.0401) 
other     -0.174*** -0.155** 
     (0.0643) (0.0674) 
       
Observations 5,288 5,288 5,288 5,288 5,098 5,098 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
8.4  Loan Adoption Regression Tables 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES logit probit logit with controls probit with controls 
     
RA_b -0.137 -0.134 -0.124 -0.0951 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.130) (0.121) 
AA5 0.215* 0.215* 0.199** 0.191** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.0953) (0.0904) 
Age   0.0140 0.0132 
   (0.0156) (0.0148) 
Age2   -0.000112 -0.000106 
   (0.000162) (0.000154) 
Education   0.0184* 0.0183* 
   (0.0104) (0.0101) 
hhsize   0.0249 0.0207 
   (0.0236) (0.0214) 
farmsize   0.00279 0.00246 
   (0.00306) (0.00227) 
banyankole   0.433*** 0.422*** 
   (0.108) (0.105) 
bakiga   0.266* 0.275* 
   (0.137) (0.159) 
     
Observations 179 179 168 168 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES logit probit logit with controls probit with controls 
     
RA_b -0.176** -0.173** -0.177* -0.165* 
 (0.0866) (0.0856) (0.0984) (0.0954) 
AA6 0.0187*** 0.0185*** 0.0133** 0.0131** 
 (0.00538) (0.00504) (0.00626) (0.00599) 
Age   0.0163 0.0156 
   (0.0151) (0.0143) 
Age2   -0.000134 -0.000127 
   (0.000155) (0.000148) 
Education   0.0130 0.0131 
   (0.0101) (0.00978) 
hhsize   0.0197 0.0180 
   (0.0206) (0.0196) 
farmsize   0.00219 0.00209 
   (0.00279) (0.00224) 
banyankole   0.374*** 0.368*** 
   (0.118) (0.117) 
banyarwanda   -0.156 -0.167 
   (0.287) (0.270) 
other   0.283 0.299 
   (0.176) (0.188) 
     
Observations 202 202 194 194 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES logit probit logit with controls probit with controls 
     
RA_b -0.167** -0.164** -0.175** -0.165* 
 (0.0826) (0.0818) (0.0891) (0.0865) 
AA7 0.216** 0.215** 0.171** 0.172** 
 (0.0872) (0.0866) (0.0709) (0.0697) 
Age   0.0186 0.0180 
   (0.0149) (0.0142) 
Age2   -0.000154 -0.000150 
   (0.000153) (0.000148) 
Education   0.0143 0.0145 
   (0.0104) (0.0102) 
hhsize   0.0184 0.0161 
   (0.0201) (0.0189) 
farmsize   0.00196 0.00193 
   (0.00223) (0.00187) 
 32 
banyankole   0.381*** 0.374*** 
   (0.118) (0.117) 
banyarwanda   -0.140 -0.153 
   (0.300) (0.283) 
other   0.295* 0.311* 
   (0.160) (0.172) 
     
Observations 202 202 194 194 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES logit probit logit with controls probit with controls 
     
RA_b -0.103 -0.104 -0.108 -0.0858 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.136) (0.121) 
AA8 0.0892 0.0892 -0.0182 -0.0169 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.0833) (0.0814) 
Age   0.0112 0.0105 
   (0.0154) (0.0149) 
Age2   -8.05e-05 -7.31e-05 
   (0.000162) (0.000160) 
Education   0.0142 0.0140 
   (0.0104) (0.0101) 
hhsize   0.0290 0.0258 
   (0.0241) (0.0227) 
farmsize   0.00274 0.00256 
   (0.00348) (0.00297) 
banyankole   0.441*** 0.435*** 
   (0.107) (0.106) 
bakiga   0.253 0.263 
   (0.154) (0.175) 
     
Observations 179 179 168 168 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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8.5  AA2 Index Histogram, by Enumerator (9 of 10 shown) 
 
 
